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Do migrants under certain circumstances have special moral obligations towards their society of 
origin? This thesis will answer this question in the affirmative. Before I provide some definitions of the 
most important terms involved and outline the structure of this thesis, I would like to share the event 
that first inspired me to think about the special moral relationship between a migrant and her society 
of origin.  
 Not long ago I had a conversation with a young man who was born in Angola, had moved to 
Portugal with his family at a young age and was at the time of the conversation living in the 
Netherlands. He had been involved in development work in Angola for some years already.  We started 
discussing the topic of whether migrants have moral obligations towards their society of origin. He did 
not want to go so far as saying he himself had any moral obligations towards Angola, but he did think 
that his father, who had moved from their birth country at a much later stage in life, probably did feel 
like he had certain special moral obligations towards Angola.  
 This man’s remarks encompass both the intuitively appealing idea that migrants have special 
obligations towards their society of origin and the feeling that particular conditions can influence 
whether or not these obligations exist. Finding out whether it is possible to provide a solid ethical basis 
for these seemingly not uncommon intuitions is one of the reasons for writing this thesis.  
 A second reason is of a more theoretical nature. To my knowledge, no systematic treatment of 
possible moral obligations of migrants towards the society of origin is in existence today. A discussion 
of this topic therefore truly adds something original to the academic debate on the ethics of migration 
within the field of social and political philosophy. It could help create a more complete overview of the 
ethical issues at play in processes of international migration.   
 Finally, discussing migrants’ obligations is also relevant outside of academic circles, especially 
in the context of current events. With large numbers of refugees moving around the globe, affecting 
many lives and causing heated public debates in many different countries, paying attention to the 
ethical dimensions involved in migration processes is undoubtedly important. It is needed to make 
good decisions about both policy and individual actions.    
Now that the three most important reasons for embarking on this research project have been 
established, a few definitions are in order. Some of the terms used so far and throughout this thesis are 
used in different contexts and could potentially mean different things to different people. To avoid any 
conclusion, it is necessary to state clearly what is meant by them here.   
A crucial concept is ‘migrant’, which refers to any individual that is now a resident of a 
different society than she was born into. I do not use the words ‘immigrants’ or ‘emigrant’, because 
these terms only make sense from the viewpoint of respectively a receiving and a sending society. The 
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object of this thesis is to examine the matter not from the societies’ perspectives but from that of the 
migrated individual herself: which, if any, moral obligations does a person incur when migrating, in 
this case obligations towards the society of origin? Something else that is important to note when the 
plural ‘migrants’ is used, is that this refers to migrated individuals, not to a migrant community as a 
whole. The question of whether communities can have moral obligations is a completely separate one 
which is not directly relevant to this thesis.     
 Society of origin is used here instead of e.g. ‘state’ or ‘country’ of origin because it is a more 
inclusive concept, which makes it more suitable for our purposes. A society is a collective of people 
cooperating and redistributing benefits under certain laws and cannot simply be identified with the 
government. Even in undemocratic societies, the culture, habits and social norms of the people 
contribute greatly to what a society is like. Using this broader concept means including all the different 
aspects that could possibly generate moral obligations for a migrant.      
The final big concept that is part of this thesis’ central question is ‘obligations’. Although to 
some the word ‘obligation’ might seem synonymous to ‘duty’, the latter term is intentionally avoided. 
C. Card has pointed out that when one speaks of ‘duties’ towards someone (or something) else, this 
implies a certain debt that the debtor must pay off and the creditor can demand (1988, 115-117). 
Assuming these things at the start of our investigation seems unnecessary and undesirable. 
‘Obligation’ is a more neutral term, which comes with fewer assumptions.   
 Moving on from what this thesis will be discussing to how it will be discussing this, I will now 
provide a short description of its structure. It starts by exploring the possibility that nationalism could 
be a source of special obligations of migrants by attempting to construct the most convincing case for 
this and see whether it holds in a situation of migration. I do this by first establishing which conditions 
an association has to meet in order to generate special moral obligations, then confirming that a nation 
meets these conditions and finally ask whether the definition of a nation and the special obligations 
that come with it can include migrants. 
Since the answer to the latter question turns out to be negative, in the second chapter I look at 
a different promising source of special obligations: gratitude. After determining under which 
conditions gratitude ought to be shown and what kind of obligations it generates, I move on to place 
gratitude in a more political context. I argue that it is possible to be grateful to a society. At the end of 
the chapter I examine if the relation of migrants towards their society of origin can meet the criteria for 
gratitude. When I have concluded that it can and, as a consequence, migrants under certain 
circumstances have special moral obligations towards their society of origin, I briefly discuss what this 
gratitude entails.          
1. Nationalism  
The most likely candidate for grounding special moral obligations towards a society seems to be 
nationalism. People often view their relationship to their fellow countrymen and the shared national 
heritage as positive and as generating certain special moral obligations. Examples of this are the 
obligation to contribute to the preservation of cultural heritage, the obligation to pay taxes to the 
national government and the obligation to prioritize aiding starving fellow nationals over aiding 
starving foreigners.  
 However, nationalism is not embraced equally by everybody and its justifiability is not 
undisputed. Accounts that claim one’s own nation is objectively superior to all other nations are 
generally not seen as acceptable. If nationalism is defined in this way, it is hard to see how any moral 
obligations could arise from it. However, there are different, more plausible accounts of special moral 
obligations of nationalism available. It is worth exploring those further, ultimately to see whether from 
them special moral obligation for migrants towards the society of origin could follow.  
Gratitude beyond Borders: Special Moral Obligations of Migrants towards the Society of Origin 
Denise Coenegracht 
 
3 
 
 In this chapter, I examine the nationalist argument for migrant obligations. In section 1.1, I 
construct what I believe to be the strongest case for special obligations based on nationalism. In the 
second section, I zoom in on the case of migrants and test whether the arguments for special 
obligations of nationalism for members of a nation are still valid for a migrated individual. It appears 
that they are not, so a different ground is needed to maintain that migrants have special moral 
obligations towards their society of origin.  
I will leave aside in this discussion instrumental justifications of special moral obligations 
from nationalism. Instead, I will only consider scenarios in which nationalism is an intrinsically valid 
ground for special moral obligations. The reason for this is that if nationalism is only instrumentally 
valuable, possible special obligations for migrants towards the society of origin that are generated by it 
would indirectly be generated by some other value. Hence, nationalism would not be the actual 
ultimate ground for the obligations.  
1.1 Special moral obligations of nationalism  
The nation is usually considered to be a specific kind of community, association or group (Miller 1988; 
Tamir 1993; Hurka 1997). This means it makes sense to start by answering the general question of 
under which conditions associations generate special moral obligations, before moving on to the 
specific issue of moral obligations from the particular association that is the nation.        
Conditions for associational moral obligations   
Different accounts exist of what kinds of associations generate special moral obligations (Brink 2001; 
Hurka 1997; Miller 2004; Scheffler 2001; Tamir 1993). In this section I review some of the elements 
suggested by different authors in an attempt to gather the most convincing list of conditions that have 
to be met for special moral obligations to be generated by an association. 
 One important question concerning associational obligations is whether an association has to 
meet some minimum standard regarding justice or goodness in order for it to be able to create moral 
obligations. The most well-known example in this context is that of the mafia. Does being a member of 
the mafia generate any special moral obligations? Y. Tamir would say it does. She claims that even 
though - like is the case with all special moral obligations - my obligations to my fellow mob members 
may be trumped by universal moral obligations, their existence is undeniable (Tamir 1993, 101).     
 However, another position seems more likely, namely that an association that generates moral 
obligations cannot be inherently unjust. D. Miller is of this opinion. He lists certain conditions which 
associations have to meet before they can be said to generate what he calls ‘ground-level special 
duties’. These are special duties that can only arise from a relationship when that relationship is 
considered to be intrinsically valuable and are much more open-ended than e.g. contractual duties 
(Miller 2004, 65).  
 One of Miller’s conditions for associations to be worthy of creating ground level special duties 
is that they cannot be of the kind “whose very existence is premised on the unjust treatment of  others” 
(Miller 2004, 66). Miller nuances this position by pointing out that this does not imply that mafia 
members can never have special obligations towards each other. They are still obligated to keep their 
promises to each other. However, in these cases the special obligations are grounded by something else 
than the mafia association, like fairness (Miller 2004, 66). 
 A similar position has been argued for by Thomas Hurka.  He thinks associative obligations 
towards a certain association can only arise when this association is of a positive nature. Hurka uses 
the example of another organisation that is usually considered to have caused great evil: the Nazi-era 
Schutzstaffel (SS). If I am a former SS member and I receive a request for a loan from another former 
member, it is counterintuitive to claim that I have an obligation to help him, Hurka argues (151-152).  
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 Millers account has shown that we can claim that no special moral obligations can be 
generated by inherently unjust associations without at the same time having to make the unlikely 
claim that we cannot have special obligations towards a fellow member of an unjust association. Based 
on the accounts and examples of Miller and Hurka, it is safe to say that the first condition for an 
association to generate moral obligations is that the association is not inherently unjust or producing 
mainly evil.   
 This condition, which we can call the condition of non-evilness, tells us what an association 
cannot be like if it is to generate special moral obligations. Non-evilness seems necessary, but not 
sufficient for an association to generate special moral obligations. What is relevant to know in addition 
is which qualities the appropriate kind of association should possess. 
 Samuel Scheffler has written on this topic. He defends that special obligations come with one’s 
relationship to other people when there is reason to value these relationships non-instrumentally. 
Scheffler considers this to be a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for special obligations, since he 
also recognizes that special obligations can be created by certain agreements between people (Scheffler 
134-137). However, Miller has pointed out that we can focus on the conditions for associations in 
themselves to generate moral obligations without denying obligations can also be grounded in other 
things than associations. So we can argue without any problems that it is a necessary condition for 
associational special moral obligations that it membership in the association should be objectively 
valuable in a non-instrumental way. 
 Adding this as a second condition for associational special obligations also has the advantage 
of excluding the possibility of insignificant associations generating obligations. Another useful element 
of the condition is that it does not make the existence of special moral obligations conditional on my 
actually valuing my membership in an association, but on whether I have good reason to value it. This 
enables us to make objective judgements about whether someone in a certain situation has special 
moral obligations or not, independent of how much a person does in fact recognize the value of her 
membership in a certain association.  
To summarise, an association can only generate special moral obligations if it meets the 
following two conditions: 
1. Condition of non-evilness: the association is not inherently unjust or producing mainly 
evil; 
2. Value condition: there is objective reason to value membership in it in a non-instrumental 
way.                
Both conditions are necessary for generating associational moral obligations. Together, they are also 
sufficient.  
One might think that if the value condition is met, the condition of non-evilness is 
automatically also met and the latter is therefore redundant. How could I have reason to value an 
association that is inherently unjust or produces mainly evil? However, to return to the familiar 
example:  imagine I have been part of the mafia my whole life and I have no idea how to survive 
outside of it. There are good reasons for me to value my membership in this evil association. Hence, we 
do need the condition of non-evilness in order to to be able to say that I do not have any moral 
obligations to the mafia here.   
The nation 
Now that we have established which conditions an association needs to meet in order to generate 
special moral obligations, we need to find out whether a nation meets these conditions. Only if this is 
the case can nationalism be a proper ground for special moral obligations towards a society in general, 
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which in turn is a condition for nationalism being able to qualify as a ground for special obligations for 
migrants towards the society of origin in particular.   
 First of all: what is a nation? The answer to this question alone could fill, and has filled, entire 
libraries (Anderson 2006; Hobsbawm 2012; Tamir 1993; Miller 1988; Miller 2004). However, for our 
purposes a rather rough and general definition of the nation will have to suffice. For simplicity’s sake, I 
will not make a distinction between a nation as a cultural entity and a state, so when I speak of a 
‘nation’, what I am referring to is a ‘nation state’, assuming that the two categories fit neatly together 
and leaving aside for a moment the many instances in which they do not. The first characteristic of a 
nation is, then, political independence, which for example Miller has argued for in the past (1988, 
648). A nation is for the most part not under the control of some higher power. 
 Secondly, the majority of the members of a nation have to believe that they have certain things 
in common, notably their history and culture. The nation is not a tangible object whose existence can 
be observed or measured, so it can only exist in the way all intangible concepts can exist: by way of 
collective agreement on the nation’s existence and on what it entails, which is a common identity of 
some sort. Similar statements about the nation can be found in Miller’s work (1988, 648).   
 If a nation is a politically independent association of which most members believe they have a 
common identity, is it nation the kind of association that generates special moral obligations? This 
depends on whether it meets the two conditions for this, as formulated in the previous section.     
To start with the first condition, that of non-evilness: is a nation inherently unjust or does it 
produce mainly evil? Some would say that a nation is inherently unjust because it benefits compatriots 
over foreigners. However, as Miller has shown, claiming this would be to assume the injustice of the 
very thing of which we are trying to find out whether it is morally justified (or even obligatory), namely 
treating compatriots in a more favourable way than non-compatriots (2004, 69-70). This is not a valid 
way of arguing. 
 Leaving out this invalid objection, there does not seem to be anything unjust or evil-producing 
about the nation by definition. Political independence for different groups of people is generally 
considered to be a good thing. A belief in a common identity also does not appear to involve much 
injustice or evil. Of course, it is not impossible that a particular nation is inherently unjust, e.g. because 
certain cruel barbaric customs are part of what defines the national identity. It is also imaginable that a 
specific nation is currently producing more evil than good. In these cases, no moral obligations can 
arise from membership in the nation. 
However, in general, a nation that harbours inherent injustices or is constantly producing 
more evil than good would not be able to last very long. After all, who would want to be part of such an 
association, let alone link an important part of their identity to it? Furthermore, we must keep in mind 
that what we are trying to establish is not whether every nation that has ever existed is a ground for 
special moral obligations, but merely whether membership in a nation can be a plausible ground for 
special moral obligations. Since the condition of non-evilness is often met by nations, so far this still 
seems possible.  
Now the value condition must be considered. Is there objective reason to value membership in 
a nation in a non-instrumental way? All we can say about a nation in general is that it is to a degree 
politically independent and that the majority of its members believe they have something in common 
with the other members. Do these qualities constitute a good reason to value membership in a nation 
non-instrumentally?  
Being a member of a group of like-minded people that are not dominated by people outside the 
group seems to be quite a valuable thing in itself. If we imagine the opposite situation of living in a 
society with people I have nothing in common with that is ruled by powers outside of our society, it is 
clear that there is some value in the qualities that the nation possesses. Of course, again, in specific 
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cases the value of all this might be doubtful, e.g. if my nation is politically independent from outside 
forces but ruled by a dictator, meaning that the will of the majority of people is ignored. But it seems 
plausible that a nation can and often does meet the value condition.  
A nation is an association that can be both non-evil and valuable and is therefore in principle 
capable of generating special moral obligations. Whether or not it does depends on the circumstances. 
Particular circumstances in which this question arises are those of the migrant. In the next section, we 
will see whether a convincing case can be made for the existence of special moral obligations of 
nationalism for migrants.  
1.2 The society of origin and special moral obligations of nationalism                  
The time has come to answer the main question of chapter 1 of this thesis: can nationalism ground 
special moral obligations for a migrant towards the society of origin? We now know that a nation can 
meet the conditions for being an association that grounds moral obligations. But do these associational 
obligations also hold for people that have left the nation?  
 The vital issue is whether the migrant can still be considered a member of the nation of the 
society of origin. Since it is part of the definition of a nation that it is a politically independent entity, 
claiming migrants are still part of the nation appears difficult. The migrant is no longer governed by 
the laws of her nation of origin. She has to live by the rules of the nation she currently resides in. One 
could try to argue that if a migrant is still allowed to vote during election times - assuming this person 
is from a democratic country- she is still involved in the political process and therefore part of the 
political side of her nation of origin. However, even if the migrant still co-determines the laws of her 
nation of origin, she is not part of it as a politically independent unit, since the laws she has to obey are 
determined by a different nation.  
 All that ‘political independence of a nation’ can mean in practice is that its members are free 
from interference by political powers outside the own nation. A migrant is in no way free from these 
external powers. If a migrant does not obey the laws of her country of residence, punishment will often 
follow. If the same migrant acts in a way that is not in accordance with the laws of the country of 
origin, there will in general be no negative consequences for this person (unless the migrant happens 
to be on the territory of the nation of origin, e.g. on holiday). It would be a stretch to say a migrant is 
still a member of her birth nation politically speaking.   
 However, for the sake of arguing, let us suppose for a moment that it is somehow possible for a 
migrant to still be part of the nation of origin as a politically independent community. In order for the 
migrant to actually be a member of the nation, she also has to be part of the ‘imagined community’. 
The migrant still has to identify in important ways with the shared features of the nation she is 
originally from. As mentioned before, history and culture are two significant things that members of a 
nation usually believe they have in common.     
For a migrant to still identify with the shared history seems possible. Presumably, the 
migrants’ ancestors have lived through similar experiences as did the ancestors of people that are still 
residing in the nation. However, as the migrant has been living in the new nation for a longer period of 
time, it becomes increasingly likely that she has not experienced events in the history of the old nation 
that its members consider to be crucial. One example of such an event would be the election of the first 
non-white President in United States history in 2008. Not having been part of this could feel like not 
having been part of an important step in American history and could cause one to feel like less a part of 
the nation. A migrant might start to feel more connected to the recent history of her new nation than to 
that of her original nation. Still, overall it is not unlikely that a migrant still identifies with the history 
of her nation of origin.   
 Then there is the issue of culture. In order to belong to a nation, one should feel like one’s 
culture is very similar to that of the members of this nation. Again, much here depends on the length of 
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time a migrant has been away. It also depends on the extent to which this person is integrated into the 
new society, in terms of cultural customs. Whether a migrant still indentifies with the culture of her 
original nation in order to still qualify as a member, will be different for every individual, but it is 
certainly possible she is still a cultural member.  
 So are migrants still members of their birth nation? They might still identify with it, or they 
might not. In the latter case, a migrant is definitely no longer a member. But even if a migrant strongly 
identifies with her nation of origin, she cannot truly be said to be a member of it, since she is not part 
of the politically independent entity. Therefore, it is hard to see how one could convincingly argue that 
a migrant is still part of the nation of origin.        
 Clearly, I cannot have associational moral obligations to an association that I am not a 
member of. As a consequence, our attempt to ground special moral obligations for migrants towards 
the society of origin in nationalism seems to have failed.  
This does not mean we have to give up on the idea that migrants can have obligations towards 
their birth society just yet. It does mean that we have to find a ground for these obligations which does 
not require that the migrant is still a member of the nation of origin. In the beginning of this chapter I 
referred to the relation between a nation and its members as a positive one. This positive evaluation of 
the membership in a nation is what made us think it could possibly ground special obligations in the 
first place. And we have discovered that it can indeed, only migrants are not enough a part of the 
nation for it to create obligations for them.  
A different sort of positive relationship that can create obligations, but which does not require 
membership in an association, is that of gratitude. If successful, a gratitude account of special moral 
obligations for migrants towards the society of origin could preserve the intuition that the obligations 
come from a positive relationship between a migrant and her society of origin, without running into 
the membership problem that made the nationalism account unsuccessful.           
2. Gratitude 
Even though it is not the easiest or philosophically most popular of moral concepts, gratitude is 
definitely worth exploring as a possible ground for special moral obligations for migrants towards their 
society of origin. Obligations to society have been grounded in gratitude before, although ‘political 
obligation’ in this context has usually referred to one obligation in particular, namely the obligation to 
obey the law (Simmons 1979; Walker 1988). I explain why I believe that this definition of ‘political 
obligation’ should be broadened below. However, before we can move on to attempting to base 
political obligations (of migrants) on gratitude, it needs to become clear what is meant by gratitude in 
general, which conditions need to be met for obligations to arise from it and what the content of these 
obligations would be. The first section of this chapter is devoted to these endeavours.    
2.1 General obligations of gratitude 
There are a few crucial elements of gratitude in general that I would like to point out in order to set the 
background for the argument that I am going to make. First of all, it is impossible to provide a 
description of gratitude purely in terms of acts. Motives and attitudes matter a great deal, those of the 
grantor of the benefits as well as those of the person who is showing gratitude.  
A related point, which F. Berger has made in a convincing way, is that gratitude cannot be 
defined simply as the appropriate response to the provision of benefits (1975, 299). Many different 
factors – of which many are attitudes of some sort - have to enter into the picture before we can speak 
of gratitude and decide what kind of obligation is generated. 
Finally, I would like to follow Card in saying that an obligation of gratitude is always an 
‘informal obligation’: a benefactor can never claim a right to gratitude – this would make him 
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undeserving of gratitude in the first place – and the fulfilment of an obligation of gratitude makes the 
relationship between two parties closer, rather than ending it. This is contrasted with the ‘formal 
obligation’ that is involved in for example a contract, the fulfilment of which usually ends the 
relationship (Card 1988, 122).    
Conditions for gratitude  
The first question regarding gratitude that needs to be answered is: when are we obliged to be grateful? 
The following conditions put together are both necessary and sufficient to create a moral obligation of 
gratitude:   
1. Benefit condition: I have received one or multiple benefits from someone or something; 
2. Personal value condition: the benefits are of a certain value to me; 
3. Condition of non-coercion: the benefits were not forced upon me by coercion1;    
4. Benevolence condition: the benefactor has provided the benefits at least partially out of 
benevolence or goodwill towards me.  
To show the intuitive correctness of these conditions, a few examples are in order. I believe the 
relevance of the benefit condition to be rather obvious, so I will start with an illustration of the 
personal value condition. Imagine, the hedge between my garden and my neighbour’s is almost non-
existent due to poor maintenance. My neighbour and I have discussed the issue and agreed that we 
would both like a new hedge to be put in. Because we are on friendly terms, she offers to do it by 
herself this Saturday when I am out of town and I accept her offer. When I return on Sunday it turns 
out the new hedge is made entirely out of box. I am severely allergic to box and need to be rushed to 
the hospital immediately after having set foot in my garden.  
 In this case, conditions 1 (benefit), 3 (non-coercion) and 4 (benevolence) have been met. My 
neighbour has provided me with a benefit by planting our common hedge. There was no coercion 
involved. Finally, my neighbour acted in part out of goodwill towards me. However, it would be very 
strange to say I am morally obliged to write her a thank-you card from the hospital or be grateful in 
any way for her planting the hedge. This is because the benefit was not of any value to me, as condition 
2 states it should be. On the contrary, I would have been much better off without it.   
  To demonstrate the relevance of the third condition, that of non-coercion, imagine the 
following scenario. I am not allergic to box, so the hedge my neighbour wants to plant is actually of 
value to me. All other conditions are equal, except for the fact that I am an orthodox Jew and am 
therefore against gardening on the Sabbath. So when my neighbour suggests to plant the hedge this 
Saturday, I thank her for her offer but request she do it another day.  
Assuming I have already left, my neighbour starts planting the hedge early Saturday morning 
anyway. When I spot her doing this, I get very upset and try to pull the shovel from her hands. She 
then becomes equally upset, pushes me away and threatens to hit me with the shovel if I do not let her 
continue. Frightened, I back off and decide to leave for the prayer group I was planning on attending. 
Most people would understand that I do not feel grateful towards my neighbour for planting the hedge 
after this incident, because she coerced me into accepting the benefit. In other words, because the 
condition of non-coercion has not been met.     
 The benevolence condition is also of great importance. Berger thinks benevolence forms the 
essence of gratitude: “Gratitude ... consist[s] in a response to benevolence; it is a response to a grant of 
benefits ... which was motivated by a desire to help us” (Berger 1975, 299). It is easy to see a benevolent 
intention is a necessary condition for gratitude.  
                                                          
1 ‘Coercion’ should be taken in a strong sense. If someone forces me into accepting benefits that I have made it clear I do not 
want for whatever reason, this is coercion. However, if I receive benefits without having given my explicit permission for being 
given them beforehand, this does not constitute coercion. If it did, I would not be obligated to show gratitude if someone saves 
my life without consulting me beforehand or if an unexpected gift from a friend is delivered to my house, which is a very 
counterintuitive claim.     
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Let us modify the neighbour-and-the-hedge-example so that I am neither allergic to box nor 
an orthodox Jew. However, my neighbour has offered to plant the hedge on her own not because of our 
friendly relationship, but because she secretly hates the sound of my voice and cannot stand to be 
around it long enough for us to plant the hedge together. In this case, the benefit condition, the 
personal value condition and the condition of non-coercion are met. We do not feel that gratitude is 
owed, however, because the fourth condition has not been fulfilled: my neighbour is not displaying any 
benevolence to me whatsoever. Instead, she is acting purely out of self-interest.    
Now that we have established under which circumstances one is morally obliged to be grateful, 
the next question is what this obligation entails. Obviously an account of this can never be more than a 
rough draft, since the concrete obligations of gratitude will depend to a large degree on the specifics of 
the situation. In the next section I attempt to formulate the contents of obligations of gratitude as 
concretely as possible.    
Contents of the obligation 
A.D.M. Walker argues that gratitude is demonstrated through a general attitude of goodwill towards 
one’s benefactor. In other words: in showing benevolence towards them, just as they have shown 
benevolence to you. This is something very different from giving the other party exactly the amount 
that has been given to you, as would be the case within a framework of reciprocity or fairness. 
Gratitude demands goodwill, a benevolent attitude that shows the grateful person wants to maintain 
the positive relationship that has been initiated by the grantor of the benefit (Walker 1988, 199-202). 
Walker formulates the first three obligations that gratitude creates in relation to ones benefactor as 
follows:  
(a) to help him if he is in need or distress and  
one can do so at no great costs to oneself; 
(b) to comply with his reasonable requests; 
(c) to avoid harming him or acting contrary to  
his interests (1988, 202)  
Walker also formulates a fourth obligation: ‘to respect his rights’. However, this seems to be a 
typical example of a general obligation that every person has towards every other person in the world. 
It therefore has no place in a list of special obligations of gratitude. Undoubtedly, much can be said 
also in critique of the other three, but there is no space to discuss all of that here. For now, I think 
Walkers concretisation of obligations generated by gratitude provides us with an intuitively plausible 
standard by which to judge whether a person is acting in an appropriately grateful way or neglecting 
her obligations and thereby displaying ingratitude.       
 To sum up: I am morally obliged to be grateful when I have received benefits that are of some 
value to me from a benevolent source that did not coerce me into accepting the benefits. Gratitude 
consists in an attitude of goodwill towards my benefactor. After in this section having sketched a 
general picture of when gratitude is called for and what it entails, in the following section I will discuss 
how gratitude could function in a non-interpersonal relation, specifically speaking in the relation 
between an individual and a society. 
2.2 Gratitude and political obligations      
In the context of this paper gratitude is only relevant if it can be moved into the political realm, in the 
form of gratitude from an individual to a society. In order to do this, we first have to show that it is 
possible for a person to be grateful to an institution or a group of persons, rather than just to another 
individual.  
Some authors have doubted the possibility of gratefulness to groups or institutions on the 
grounds that these do not have motives for acting (e.g. Simmons 1979, 187-188). This would mean that 
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they are also not capable of acting from benevolent motives, so they could never meet the benevolence 
condition for gratitude.  
It is important to keep in mind that groups and institutions are not forces of nature. They 
function in a certain way and have certain goals because different people at different points made 
certain conscious decisions. Therefore it is not a stretch to say they have motives for providing benefits 
to me. An institution does not produce benefits at random for random individuals.  
The fact that a number of conscious decisions are behind the policy of an institution or group 
should not be taken to imply that its motive is in reality the motive of one specific individual and I 
should therefore owe gratitude to this person. Instead, the interplay of various human decisions 
creates a policy – in other words: motive - that exists separate from individual considerations and can 
only be ascribed to the institution or group as such. In case this motive is benevolent and the other 
conditions for gratitude are met as well, this collective entity would be the appropriate target of my 
gratitude.    
  One example of such a group or institution that could potentially be an appropriate target for 
my gratitude, if one follows this line of reasoning, is a society. Obligations of gratitude towards a 
society are thus a real option. As mentioned before, this topic has been explored in the past, but mainly 
in relation to a specific kind of obligation, the kind that has been called ‘political obligation’ as if it was 
the only thing that could be meant by this term (Richards 1971; Walker 1988). ‘Political obligation’ in 
these cases refers to the obligation to obey the law.  
I would like to broaden the term ‘political obligation’ to mean ‘any moral obligation that one 
has to one’s society’, since I see no point in isolating this one obligation of obeying the law. In common 
usage we often speak of other obligations to ones society as well. For example, many feel like after a 
certain age people should get a job, among other reasons to contribute to the economy of the society. 
Another political obligation would be to ensure justice is served when one can, for example by calling 
the emergency services when witnessing a crime or by serving as a juror in a legal procedure. Some of 
the many moral obligations to one’s society could still be binding for migrants as well, unlike the 
political obligation to obey the law.  
Something that might seem troublesome when using gratitude as a basis for obligations to 
one’s society is the informal nature of the obligations that it can generate. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, the benefactor - in this case the society - can never claim a right to gratitude 
from the receiver of the benefits - in this case the (former) member of the society. However, I am 
merely trying to show that gratitude towards their society (of origin) can generate certain moral 
obligations for people. Whether this society has the right to demand that they fulfil these obligations or 
even to force them to do so, is a separate debate, which is not directly relevant to our current 
discussion.      
     If I should be grateful to my society and exactly how this gratitude should be displayed, 
depends, like in any case of gratitude, on the circumstances. In the next section I will take the specifics 
of the circumstance of having migrated from one society to another as a starting point and see if any 
obligations of gratitude towards the society of origin exist in this case. 
2.3 The society of origin and special moral obligations of gratitude            
In this section, I will first examine under which circumstances the conditions for gratitude are met in 
the case of migrants and their society of origin. I will then explore what the content of the obligation of 
migrants would roughly be on this account.  
 In order to meet the first condition for gratitude, the benefit condition, the migrant must have 
received certain benefits from their society of origin. This usually seems to be the case. Even if I have 
lived in my birth country only as an infant, I have most likely been transported in a pram or on my 
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mother’s shoulder on roads build by society. Maybe my parents have even received child support so 
that they were able to take better care of me.  
There are some exceptional circumstances imaginable in which a migrant has, during her 
entire stay in her country of origin, not received any benefits from the society. This would be the case if 
this person was de facto not connected to the society that she de jure belonged to, due to e.g. the 
remoteness of location or the fact that the de jure society was de facto a failed state. In this case the 
first condition for gratitude is not met. Migrants who have this kind of background can never be said to 
have any obligations of gratitude towards their society of origin.      
 For the majority of migrants, the ones that have received benefits, the remaining three 
conditions still have to be met in order for them to have obligations of gratitude. The next condition 
that needs to be met is the personal value condition. Initially, this condition seems easily met. The 
examples of roads and child support given in the previous paragraph will in most cases be of value to 
me.  
The history of some migrants will lead to the conclusion that the personal value condition is 
not met. Sometimes someone has received benefits from a society that are of a certain value to her, but 
the costs of being part of this society – and thus for receiving the benefits - outweigh the benefits she 
has received. This means that, overall, the net personal value of the benefits is negative. This in itself 
could be a reason for migrating, for example if one is born into a society at war.  
This provision should not be taken to mean that a situation in which a migrant was forced to 
leave the society of origin due to adverse circumstances could never meet the personal value condition. 
It is very well possible, for example, that a person has lived a happy life and received countless valuable 
benefits from a society before a particular event occurred that caused her to have to flee. In case this 
event is a natural disaster of some sort that the society could not have prevented, it is clear that the net 
personal value of the received benefits remains positive.  
However, even if the society did cause the negative event, like in the case of political 
persecution, the net value of having been part of that society can still be positive for the refugee, if the 
added value of benefits received before the event was greater than the cost of this event for the 
individual. These circumstances would still meet the personal value condition and therefore the 
migrant would not be excluded from obligations of gratitude on the grounds that receiving the benefits 
lacked value for her. The conclusion must then be that, although certain migrants will not have the 
obligation to show gratitude towards the society of origin because the net value of the benefits received 
is negative to them, for a significant portion of migrants the condition of personal value is met. The 
latter group would be obligated to show gratitude to the society of origin in case the remaining two 
conditions are also met.       
Most societies do not spend their time coercing people into accepting benefits. Coercion is 
usually applied by states only in the opposite case, to make people accept things that are not directly 
beneficial to them personally, such as joining the army or paying taxes. One could also encounter 
coercion within one’s society that does not come from the state. In these situations as well, coercion 
usually takes place if someone wants to do something that will have a negative impact on another 
person’s life, such as rob them, not in order to confer benefits.    
Of course, there are exceptional cases in which a society does coerce someone into accepting 
benefits. If a psychiatric patient presents a serious danger to himself and receives forced treatment, 
this is a benefit for this person that will most likely be of value to them in the longer term, even though 
she may fight very hard at this moment to resist it. However, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which a 
significant part of the benefits received from society is forced upon a citizen in this way. Therefore the 
condition of non-coercion will probably always be met for migrants.      
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 Some disagreement might arise concerning the fulfilment of the benevolence condition. Does a 
state provide me with benefits out of benevolence or goodwill towards me? We have established that it 
is possible for institutions and groups of people – and therefore for a society - to have motives. 
However, whether these motives are benevolent is something that is not yet clear. In general, it seems 
that benefits provided to citizens by society are distributed at least partially to improve the lives of 
these citizens. This motive seems to be involved in, say, setting up public education or building roads. 
The politicians creating these policies might be doing this for entirely selfish reasons, for example 
because they want to get re-elected or improve their countries’ reputation abroad. But the direct aim of 
distributing benefits is to benefit people.   
This effectively means that the institution that is society as a whole has a benevolent policy or 
motive in distributing benefits. In addition to distributing benefits, a society might also do a lot of 
other - possibly horribly evil – things. But when distributing benefits, it is most of the time benevolent. 
The benevolence condition for creating an obligation of gratitude therefore normally applies for 
migrants in relation to their society of origin.  
 It seems that it is indeed possible, under certain circumstances, to ground moral obligations 
for migrants towards the society of origin in gratitude. The benefit condition is usually met, the 
personal value condition is often met, the condition of non-coercion is probably always met and the 
benevolence condition is normally met for migrants in relation to the society they are originally from.   
Next, it would be good to know what this obligation of gratitude for migrants towards the 
society of origin - when it is present - actually entails. To find out, we can use Walker’s account of the 
content of  obligations of gratitude that was mentioned in the first section of this thesis – minus his 
fourth obligation, which, as explained, I believe should be left out due to its general nature. A migrant 
would then typically have the following obligations to its society of origin: help the society if it requires 
aid and the migrant can do so at a relatively low cost to herself, comply with any reasonable request 
the society might have and refrain from doing anything that would be damaging to the society.  
 This list of obligations may sound rather abstract, so let us try to capture the practical 
implications of it. In which situations would we say that a society requires aid? Definitely if the 
existence of the society or its members is threatened, for example in a conflict situation or after a 
natural disaster. In reality, these have often been occasions on which migrant communities all over the 
world have put in more effort than other people have in assisting their society of origin. Recently, this 
happened in response to the floods in Southeast Europe in 2014 (Pasic 2014; Toe 2016; “Bosnian 
immigrants in”).  
It seems plausible to see providing aid in times of conflict or natural disaster as part of a 
migrant’s obligation to her society of origin. Of course, to a certain extent this is a general obligation 
for humans to the rest of mankind. However, in the case of a migrant who stands in a relation of 
gratitude towards her society of origin, we can say the obligation to aid is more clearly present and 
more demanding than for a random other person.      
 Complying with any reasonable request of the society is an obligation that could mean a lot of 
different things in practice. A lot depends on what we consider to be ‘reasonable’. This can only really 
be judged on a case-to-case basis. To at least define the opposite ends of the spectrum: providing the 
embassy of my society of origin with a scan of my passport for administrative purposes would be a 
reasonable request that I would be morally obliged to comply with. Fighting a war for this society 
would count as an unreasonable request, so I am not morally obliged to do it. 
 Again, some might say that complying with reasonable requests is a general obligation for 
everyone. Although we might consider a person that always complies with all reasonable requests to be 
nicer than a person who sometimes or often does not, it would be a stretch to say the latter person is 
failing to fulfil her moral obligations. Sometimes she might simply not feel like helping out the asking 
party and this can be perfectly acceptable. On the other hand, not complying with the reasonable 
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request of a society to which one stands in a special relationship, namely a relationship of gratitude, 
seems like something we would be more likely to judge. We would deem it to be ungrateful and 
therefore morally wrong.      
 An obligation that is more straightforward is the obligation not to do anything that would be 
damaging to my society of origin. To give a very specific example: if I am offered a well-paying job as a 
lobbyist for an oil company that is using the natural resources of my society of origin without letting 
this society share in the benefits, I would be morally obliged not to accept this job. Naturally, there are 
also grey areas in which it is not clear if a certain action would actually harm my society of origin, 
creating a moral dilemma.  
 Of course, in general one should try to avoid harming anyone or anything as much as possible. 
The reality is, however, that it is impossible to live without causing harm. I harm the environment by 
using water to bathe myself, I harm the other applicants for a job by accepting it when it is offered to 
me, etc. The point of the special obligation for a grateful migrant to avoid harming or acting contrary 
to the interests of her society of origin is that she should prioritise not causing harm to or damaging 
the interests of this society over not causing harm to or damaging the interests of others, to whom she 
does not have special obligations.          
In short, the gratitude account of special moral obligations for migrants argues that gratitude 
can be a basis for special obligations of migrants to the society of origin. These obligations arise if a 
migrant has received benefits from the society, these benefits were of net personal value to her, she 
was not coerced into accepting the benefits and the benefits were provided at least in part out of 
benevolence. Under normal circumstances, the first, third and fourth conditions are met. The personal 
value condition is sometimes not met, if the received benefits have carried greater costs than value to 
the migrated individual. When the personal value condition is met, the migrant is morally obliged to 
show her gratitude to the society in three ways: by providing aid when it is in distress (if the cost to 
oneself is not great), by complying with its reasonable requests and by not causing it any harm.   
Possible objections to the gratitude account of special obligations for migrants   
In what follows, I discuss some objections that might be raised against the gratitude account of special 
moral obligations for migrants I have outlined. For each, I explain how a defender of the gratitude 
account could respond to them.  
The main thing that could be doubted is whether the four general conditions for an obligation of 
gratitude to come about are strong enough. The conditions I have included are: the benefit condition, 
the personal value condition, the condition of non-coercion and the benevolence condition. A.J. 
Simmons’ list of conditions is longer. He claims that providing the benefit has to have involved special 
effort or sacrifice for the benefactor (1979, 167-179). Intuitively, it might seem like Simmons is right in 
including this additional condition. Why would we have to be grateful to someone for doing something 
for us that took no special effort to accomplish?   
A.D.M. Walker has convincingly shown that this intuition is misguided. He uses the example of a 
strong and experienced swimmer for this. If he happens to swim past a person as she is drowning in a 
lake and it takes him virtually no effort to take her with him on his back on his way back to the shore, 
we still feel the person whose life has been saved should be grateful to the swimmer (Walker 1988, 
208). Here, even though no “special effort or sacrifice for the benefactor” was involved, gratitude is 
clearly in order, which shows that the condition proposed by Simmons is not a necessary condition for 
creating special obligations of gratitude. The effort a society has made to provide benefits therefore 
also does not have to be taken into account when deciding whether a migrant should be grateful to her 
society of origin.   
Another condition for gratitude that some might want to argue should be added to the list, is 
that the benefactor could not have been doing her duty in granting the benefit. They might ask: is it not 
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simply a matter of course that people do their duty? Why would gratitude be required in this case? If 
correct, this would be a strong counterargument against the existence of moral obligations of gratitude 
for migrants towards their society of origin. It could then easily be argued that it is not only the duty of 
a society to provide benefits to its members, but perhaps even the whole point of its existence. If 
gratitude is never required for doing one’s duty, this would make gratitude for benefits provided by 
society an impossibility. 
To show that obligations of gratitude can arise even if the benefactor is performing a duty, let 
us return to the case of the strong swimmer. Few would doubt that it is a general duty for every 
individual to save another person’s life if this person is dying in front of one’s eyes and it is possible to 
save them at virtually no cost to oneself. It was the strong swimmer’s moral duty to save the drowning 
person. Yet, as pointed out before, we still feel that the person whose life has been saved should be 
grateful to the swimmer. This means it is not a necessary condition for gratitude that the benefactor 
was not performing a duty and it is possible to hold that the state has a duty to provide benefits and 
still think the provision of these benefits can be cause for special moral obligations of gratitude.   
 The possible objections I have discussed above are targeted against my general account of 
special obligations from gratitude. Objections have also been formulated against gratitude-generated 
political obligations in particular, for example by G. Klosko (1991). However, these objections are 
directed at accounts that use ‘political obligations’ in the common, narrow sense, as the obligation to 
obey the state. As a consequence, the counterarguments stated are not applicable to my account of 
political obligations from gratitude, since I define political obligations differently, namely as all the 
different kinds of moral obligations one can have to a society. For this reason, I will not examine these 
objections here.  
 To summarize: opponents of my gratitude account of political obligations might think I have 
neglected some important conditions for gratitude and the obligations accompanying it, namely that 
there has to have been special effort involved for the benefactor in providing the benefit and that the 
benefactor could not have been doing a duty in providing the benefit. However, the example of a strong 
swimmer saving a drowning person shows that it is not necessary to add these conditions to create 
obligations of gratitude.  
Conclusion 
We have seen that nationalism, even though it can sometimes be a ground for special moral 
obligations, is not a viable source for moral obligations of migrants towards the society of origin. The 
reason for this is quite simple, namely that migrants cannot generally speaking be considered 
members of the nation that they were once a part of anymore.  
 Gratitude, on the other hand, can and often does generate moral obligations for migrants 
towards their society of origin. A relation of gratitude between a society and its members does not 
depend on criteria of political unity or identity like in the case of a nation. Yet it preserves the positive 
relation between a migrant and its former society as the basis for special moral obligations, which is 
the element that made basing obligations on nationalism seem so obvious and attractive in the first 
place.  
 What are the implications of the position that has been defended in this thesis, the position 
that migrants often have special moral obligations of gratitude towards the society of origin? First of 
all, of course there are consequences for certain migrated individuals themselves. If they have special 
moral obligations towards their society of origin, it means they should be among the first to act when 
some unjust or unfortunate situation develops in their country of origin, like an armed conflict or a 
natural disaster. In addition, in some cases the obligations could be even stronger, e.g. to promote the 
economic development of the society of origin. The exact nature of the obligations depends on the 
specific situation of the migrant and how much reason this person has to be grateful to the society of 
origin.  
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 For the young man who I introduced at the beginning of this thesis, the gratitude account 
could explain his intuition that his father does have special moral obligations towards Angola, while he 
himself does not. It is very possible that in the case of his father the personal value condition is met, 
while in his own situation it is not. If he had been part of the Angolan society for only a short period 
before having to leave because of some burden society was imposing on him and his family, the value 
of the benefits he has received from the society for him might be smaller than the hardships he has had 
to suffer. His father, on the other hand, might already have been receiving valuable benefits from 
society for decades, making the value scale tip to the positive side for him.         
 In addition to the implications the gratitude account of special obligations for migrants has for 
individual migrants, there are also broader implications for governments’ policies regarding both 
emigrants and immigrants. Societies should not put in place policies that prevent people from fulfilling 
their moral obligations. If migrants have moral obligations towards their society of origin, this means 
both the sending and the receiving society should make it possible for migrants to show their gratitude 
to the society they were born into.  
Very minimally, this requires of both societies that they allow migrants to travel back and forth 
for occasional visits. However, on the other end of the spectrum, they could provide funding for 
initiatives of migrants that aim to help develop the society of origin in a positive direction, such as 
peacebuilding projects. An excellent example of this is the funding the Dutch ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has provided to the non-governmental organization Oxfam Novib for its capacity building 
programme for Diaspora organisations (De Bruyn 2008).    
 In the field of academic philosophy, it is necessary that the ethical implications of global 
migration are explored from more diverse viewpoints than just that of the receiving society, as has 
been the dominant trend so far (Carens 2013; Wellman and Cole 2011; Miller 2010). This thesis has 
demonstrated that it is indeed possible to seriously discuss the moral implications of migrating for the 
individuals that engage in it. Hopefully it can form the beginning of a new tradition of involving the 
viewpoint of migrants themselves in the ethical debates on migration.  
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